

SUCCESSFUL VIRTUAL STRATEGY FOR NORM DIFFUSION

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Предисловие

Работа «Successful Virtual Strategy for norm Diffusion» талантливого американского ученого, занимающегося изучением и обобщением закономерностей дипломатического и экономического поведения стран, втягивающихся в глобальную сеть Европы через распространение общеевропейских норм общепития имеет эвристическую ценность высокого интеллектуального уровня, потому как основана на виртуальном прогнозировании особенностей путей развития Европы.

В работе сделан тщательный анализ путей введения, а также результатов введения Единых Европейских норм.

Сделан сравнительный анализ возможных стратегий распространения Европейских норм и рассмотрены возможные (виртуальные) варианты сообщества с учетом расширения при приеме новых членов союза.

Результаты исследований создают основы надежного планирования дальнейшего успешного развития единой демократической Европы. Это существенно образом влияет на будущее тех, кто проживает в восточных областях Европы. В том числе, Сибири.

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European integration has commonly been viewed as an extremely important factor in leading to the peace and stability of Europe (see Diez et al., 2006; Higashino, 2004; Wallenstein, 2002). Prior studies of European integration have determined that one of the original goals of the European Community was to achieve lasting peace in Western Europe after World War II, and more specifically to develop a lasting resolution to the Franco-German conflict (see Wallenstein, 2002). The European Community did help to lessen the tensions between France and Germany through economic interdependence and spill over effects, and this success helped to bolster the idea that further integration was necessary to achieve peace and stability in Europe. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, former Communist countries in Europe became independent, but were unstable. Thus, scholars argued that Europe would achieve lasting peace and stability

by further integration to the east (see Higashino, 2004).

Once the European Union became fully established, norm diffusion emerged as one of the most effective ways in which integration could bring about peace and stability. This is due to the fact that as states adopt European norms, specifically those of freedom of movement, uncorrupt governments, a single market, and strong human rights, states become more democratic, which in turn leads to peace and stability (e.g. see Russett, 1993; Hensel, Goertz and Diel, 2000). Thus, the European Union uses integration as a means of norm diffusion (e.g. see Tocci et al., 2008; Noutcheva, 2007; Noutcheva et al., 2004). The use of norm diffusion is especially prevalent in the post Cold War period, as the European Union began to focus on creating not just a stable and peaceful Europe, but a stable and peaceful Europe with a shared identity possessing similar norms. Although several treaties of the European Union mention shared norms related to human rights and the common market, it wasn't until the Copenhagen Criteria were agreed upon in 1993 that European norms related to democracy and human rights were specifically articulated (see Tocci et al., 2008). This paper specifically focuses on those shared European norms articulated in the Copenhagen Criteria that must be adopted by all candidate states prior to accession. Specifically, the Copenhagen Criteria state that there are three criteria that must be met by candidate states prior to accession: 1) states must have political stability, namely the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities. 2) States must have economic stability, namely a market economy with the capacity to cope with competition and market forces within the European Union. 3) States must accept the European Community acquis, specifically they must take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of the European Union.¹ Each of these three criteria represents the European norms that must be adopted by candidate countries prior to accession.

Although European shared norms can be identified through the Copenhagen Criteria, few scholars have examined what methods the

European Union employs to ensure norm diffusion. More importantly, once the methods that the European Union employs to ensure norm diffusion are identified, it is important to ascertain which method is the most successful, which has broad policy implications as to how the European Union can influence states to adopt norms.

This study examines the impact of EU norm diffusion on both member states and candidate states. Therefore, the European Union faces two different situations when it seeks to diffuse norms. The first situation is to target candidate states to ensure the adoption of shared European norms.³ The second situation is to target member states to ensure the adoption of specific norms. Logically, the European Union should be able to more effectively influence member states than influence candidate states in adopting norms, however, this paper argues that by utilizing the accession process, the European Union is actually better able to influence candidate states that wish to become members than current member states. This study concludes this by examining the case of Estonia and Latvia before accession as well as the case of Bulgaria and Romania after accession. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the European Union was able to assist both countries in developing a policy towards Russian minorities that was acceptable to both the European Union and the Russian Federation prior to their accession to the European Union. Whereas, the case of Bulgaria and Romania shows that by agreeing to a concrete timetable on accession, the EU binds itself with few opportunities to back track and has to exert influence of these countries after membership, and once a candidate has become a member state, there is little that the European Union can do in order to influence member states to adopt specific norms. In other words, once a candidate has become a member state, the European Union can do little to ensure that states are able to move from stage one to stage two in the lifecycle of norms.

The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor

Given that the European Union wishes to influence states through norm diffusion, a logical question arises as to whether or not non-member states would be interested in joining the European Union, and what their motivations are for joining. Caplanova et al. (2004) argue that states in Central and Eastern Europe are very much in favor of joining the European Union. They argue that this is largely due to self-interest. Citizens of those states see financial, free movement and security gains to be made by

joining. Not only will citizens have access to the European market, but they will also be able to freely move, thus providing them with expanded human rights. Moreover, due to the rotating European presidency, states would be able to be the focus of much more attention than they would ever be able to as separate nation states. The increased focus would in turn bring more prestige and financial gain. Even though membership in the European Union would mean a reduction of state sovereignty, citizens are overwhelmingly in favor of joining the European Union as the benefits to membership far outweigh the costs.

The goals of both the European Union and European non-member states are mutually inclusive. The European Union wishes non-member states to adopt shared European norms and non-member states are willing to adopt those norms as long as they are considered for membership. Thus, it is only logical to assume that the European Union would use the accession process in order to influence the adoption of norms by non-member states. In fact, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that the desire for norm diffusion by the European Union coupled with the desire of Central and Eastern European states to join the European Union has enabled the European Union to affect the domestic policies of candidate countries to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, Grabbe (2006) argues that states who wish to become member states are willing to fundamentally transform just to be considered for membership, which enables the European Union to affect domestic policies of non-member states prior to those states becoming candidate states.

Bulgaria and Romania as a Test of Intra-European Norm Diffusion

An official reprimand from the European Union also has the added effect of making it more difficult for Bulgaria and Romania to receive funds from the European Union. Structural funds as well as other funds from the European Union would dry up, as the European Union could not be sure that the funds were being used for their intended purpose. Thus, by writing a scathing report on the progress of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Union is trying to affect through peer pressure as well as financial pressure. The question remains as to how effective this pressure is in influencing Bulgaria and Romania to adopt shared European norms.

The final strategy that the European Union can choose to employ is to revoke membership from both Bulgaria and Romania. The problem with this option is that there is finality in this de-

cision. There is no room to make the threat to revoke membership and then revoke their membership in the future, as the threat as made at the time of accession. Moreover, the cost of invoking this option is extremely high, as there will be differing opinions about whether or not such a severe option is even an option. Since no member state has ever had membership revoked, revoking membership would create a very dangerous precedence. Those member countries that are not able to follow every European directive would then have to fear expulsion. Thus, revoking membership from both Bulgaria and Romania would be the "nuclear option," and one that would only be used should there be no other option.

The European Union chose to pursue the first option. In January of 2008, the European Commission published a scathing report for each country. The report for each country possessed details on the lack of progress in adopting necessary reforms. Although the European Commission recognizes that some progress has been made, it strongly states that not enough progress is being made.

The publication of the reports caused quite a reaction from the media, and negative attention was focused on both Bulgaria and Romania. The question is whether or not this strategy can actually work. Will bad publicity and peer pressure from other member states be the catalyst of change, or will Bulgaria and Romania choose just to whether this storm of bad publicity and peer pressure now that they are member states? Moreover, will investors and the risk of financial repercussions prove to be enough to influence Bulgaria and Romania to adopt shared European norms. Prior to accession the incentive to adopt reforms was high, but upon accession, the incentive to adopt reforms has significantly diminished unless the European Council decides to revoke membership status and agree to reinstate the country upon compliance.

Prior to accession, the dilemma of elites that have tried to enact reforms with resistance from their constituents is not a serious dilemma. The European Union would continue to promise accession to a candidate state contingent upon the successful internalization of the shared European norms. However, once a state becomes a member state, this dilemma once again becomes very serious. A country's elite can create instability in a country by insisting on necessary reforms despite the dissent of its citizenry. The elites must then employ a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not the continued enactment of reforms is worth the domestic

audience costs. Prior to accession, membership in the European Union would outweigh domestic audience costs, however, after accession, domestic audience costs may outweigh the benefits of continuing to enact the necessary reforms. Thus, after accession, the European Commission is forced to make a determination about the progress of member states in adopting the shared European goals. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Commission believed that although some progress had been made towards the adoption of shared European norms, that there were still many reforms that needed to be enacted in order to satisfy the European Council.

Despite the fact that a scathing report can have financial consequences from both the European Union and investors and that peer pressure can be a powerful tool, it remains to be seen whether the use of a report can be an effective tool of norm diffusion. The case of Bulgaria and Romania will provide future insight as to whether or not writing a scathing report will be effective. However, the current evidence indicates that the measures will prove unsuccessful (see Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008).

Conclusion

Building upon the fact that the European Union is a normative power that utilizes norm diffusion, this paper has identified the different strategies that the European Union can utilize in order to influence states to adopt European norms. The European Union can influence either non-member states or member states to adopt prescribed norms.

Table 1 – EU norm diffusion strategies

	Successful	Unsuccessful
Non-member States	Accession with no concrete time table	Accession with concrete time table
Member States		1. Publish a Report to Utilize Peer Pressure 2. Financial Consequences 3. Exposure of Economic Mismanagement 4. Frightening off Investors Threaten to Revoke Membership

The policy implications of this study are quite clear (see Table 1). Logically, it would seem that the European Union would be better able to utilize norm diffusion on member states than non-member states, however, the case

studies used in this study convincingly prove that the European Union is much more effective at influencing non-member states than member states. The Estonian and Latvian case illustrates that non-member states are generally willing to adopt European norms provided that they are offered membership. Thus, the accession process is the most valuable and important strategy that the European Union can utilize to ensure that non-member states adopt prescribed norms (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 – Successful virtual strategy for norm diffusion

The important caveat to utilizing the accession strategy to assure norm diffusion is that enough time must be allowed in order to allow candidate countries to fully internalize the prescribed norms. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, enough time had passed since beginning the transformation process that both countries were able to institutionalize the prescribed norms and successfully integrate into the European Union. The case of Bulgaria and Romania, however,

shows that if enough time is not allowed to pass for reforms to become institutionalized, that necessary reforms will not be enacted, and that new member states will not be able to successfully integrate into the European Union. Thus, although the most effective strategy to ensure norm diffusion is to use the accession strategy, the European Union must allow for institutionalization of European norms to occur prior to granting membership. If the European Union does not fully allow for the institutionalization of reforms, it will have no choice but to accept a candidate who will not be able to fully integrate into the European Union or deny membership to a candidate country and risk alienating some of the other member states.

Finally, once a state becomes a member state, the options for norm diffusion become very limited. The first option to influence a member state to adopt norms is to publicly shame it into action by publicly chastising a member state for failing to adopt shared European norms. This chastisement has the added benefit of providing financial consequences through a decrease of investment from both the European Union and other investors including foreign investment. However, the chastisement option has a small probability of success. The second option is to revoke the membership of the member state, which is an option that must only be considered as a last resort and would set a very dangerous precedent. Thus, the only real policy solution to ensure norm diffusion is to target non-member states by using the accession strategy with no concrete time limit. Choosing any other policy would not lead to ensured norm diffusion.